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MANDATORY WORKER PARTICIPATION IS REQUIRED IN A
DECLINING UNION ENVIRONMENT TO PROVIDE EMPLOYEES
WITH MEANINGFUL INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY*
By Charles B. Craver**

[W]e must have democracy in industry as well as in government; . .
. democracy in industry means fair participation by those who work
in the decisions vitally affecting their lives and livelihood; and . . .
the workers in our great industries can enjoy this participation only
if allowed to organize and bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing.1

Approaching the twenty-first century, the United States
effectively stands alone among the developed nations, on the verge
of having no effective system of worker representation and
consultation. . . . Survey data indicate that some 30 to 40 million
American workers without union representation desire such
representation, and some 80 million workers, many of whom do
not approve of unions, desire some independent collective voice in
their workplace.2

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1935, Senator Wagner proposed the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA).3 He hoped that the NLRA would provide employees with the opportunity to participate
in and influence management decisions that affected basic employment conditions.4 Congress
explicitly recognized “[t]he inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not
possess full freedom of association . . . and employers who are organized in the corporate
[form].”5 Through resort to collective action, workers were expected to share decision-making
authority with their corporate employers.
When the Supreme Court sustained the Constitutionality of the NLRA, it similarly
acknowledged the need for concerted employee action to counterbalance the economic power of
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corporate firms.
[A] single employee was helpless in dealing with an
employer; . . . he was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the
maintenance of himself and family; . . . [and] if the employer
refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair, he was
nevertheless unable to leave the employ and resist arbitrary and
unfair treatment . . .6
The enactment of the NLRA and the formation of the Congress of Industrial Organizations
(CIO) generated rapid union growth.7 As CIO unions organized heavy industries such as steel,
automobile, and electrical manufacturing, labor organization membership expanded. By 1940,
there were 8,717,000 union members, comprising 26.9 percent of nonagricultural workers.8 At
the end of World War II, unions had 14,322,000 members, representing 35.5 percent of the
nonagricultural workforce.9 By 1954, labor membership exceeded 17,000,000, with unions still
representing 35 percent of nonagricultural employees.10
By the early 1960s, organized labor began to experience a relative decline in membership,
as union ranks grew more slowly than the overall labor force.11 Heavy industries in the organized
Northeast and Midwest were no longer expanding.12 Many people and jobs were migrating from
Snow Belt states to Sun Belt areas in the South and Southwest.13 The American economy was
being transformed from industrial/manufacturing jobs to primarily white-collar and service
occupations which were filled by individuals who were generally unreceptive to union entreaties.
In addition to these negative factors, overt employer opposition to labor organizations increased,
as business firms that were being forced to compete in global markets concluded that the
increased labor costs associated with collective bargaining relationships undermined their
economic viability.14 Throughout the 1980s, labor organization membership declined
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significantly. By 1990, private sector unions had only 10,260,000 members, comprising a mere
12.1 percent of nonagricultural employees.15 Today, private sector union membership is
approaching 9,000,000, representing an anemic 10.4 percent of nonagricultural workers.16 If this
trend continues, the union density rate may fall to 5 percent or below by the early part of the
twenty-first century.
Over the past several years, organized labor has worked diligently to stem the decline in
private sector membership. The election of new AFL-CIO leaders and a renewed emphasis on
union organizing has generated a belief that labor organizations may be able to reverse the
negative slide.17 Nonetheless, even if unions were able to increase the private sector membership
rate to 20 or even 25 percent -- a highly optimistic projection -- this would still leave 75 to 80
percent of private sector employees with no meaningful influence over corporate decisions that
directly affect their employment destinies.

A. THE IMPACT OF DECLINING UNIONIZATION
The decline in union membership has diminished the rights of organized workers and
indirectly undermined the rights of unorganized personnel. Empirical evidence indicates that
employees who have selected bargaining agents have enhanced their individual economic
benefits.18 Their wages have been improved, and they have obtained health care coverage,
pension programs, supplemental unemployment benefits, disability protection, day care centers,
and other important fringe benefits.19 As union membership has declined, pressures from
nonunion competitors have caused unionized firms to moderate wage increases and decrease
fringe benefit protections.20 Similar studies suggest that unorganized personnel have received
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indirect economic gain from the labor movement, since their employers have provided them with
benefit packages competitive with those enjoyed by unionized employees.21 As these business
firms have no longer feared the possible unionization of their own employees, many have ceased
being as concerned about the relative status of their employment terms.
Representative unions do not merely provide members with enhanced economic benefits.
Through the “collective voice” exerted by organized groups, employees have advanced important
non-economic interests.22 Contractual provisions generally preclude discipline except for “just
cause.”23 This contrasts with the traditional “at will” doctrine, which permits employers to
discharge workers for good cause, bad cause, or no cause at all.24 Other clauses typically establish
orderly layoff and recall procedures and require the application of relatively objective criteria to
promotional opportunities.
When organized employees are not satisfied with the way in which contractual terms have
been applied, they may invoke grievance-arbitration procedures.25 During grievance-adjustment
sessions, labor and management representatives are usually able to negotiate mutually acceptable
solutions to their contractual disputes.26 When they are unable to achieve mutual accords, the
dissatisfied parties may ask neutral arbitrators to determine the controverted issues.27 Grievancearbitration procedures prevent arbitrary employer action and provide workers with impartial
determinations of disagreements pertaining to the interpretation of collective contract terms.28
Without the rights established through the collective bargaining process, such orderly and wholly
neutral grievance adjustment systems would not exist as extensively as they do today.29
Even though an expanding number of corporate employers have been recently able to
avoid the economic pressures associated with collective bargaining relationships, they have begun
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to experience other legal constraints. Throughout the 1940s, 1950s, and early 1960s, most private
sector employment conditions were determined for unionized firms through the collective
bargaining process.30 Individual employers negotiated with local union officials regarding the
employment terms applicable to their particular employees. When unique circumstances
warranted special treatment, the bargaining parties were usually able to accommodate each other’s
competing interests.31 As union membership shrank, employers began to enjoy the freedom to
determine their employment conditions unilaterally.32 While they appreciated the absence of labor
influence, legislative and judicial developments began to fill the power vacuum created by the
decline of organized labor.
Over the past three decades, the decreasing power of private sector unions has been
counterbalanced by increased external regulation of employment environments as unrepresented
workers have demanded enhanced rights and protections. A brief review of the more salient
developments should demonstrate the impact of proliferating legislative and judicial intervention.
The Equal Pay Act of 196333 prohibited compensation differentials between male and female
employees performing equal work. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196434 proscribed all
employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, gender, and national origin. The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 196735 banned discrimination against individuals forty and
older. The Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment of 197836 extended the Title VII prohibition
against gender discrimination to distinctions based on pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical
conditions.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 197037 requires employers to provide safe
employment environments, with Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations
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specifying the exact conditions that must be provided, even when alternative circumstances might
equally protect employee interests. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 197438
prescribed minimal vesting rules for private sector pension programs, established prudent investor
obligations, and created standards that had to be satisfied with respect to other fringe benefit
programs. The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 198839 requires sixty-day
advanced notice of mass layoffs and plant closures, while the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 198840
obliges employers to take steps to minimize drug usage among employees. The Employee
Polygraph Protection Act of 198841 outlawed the use of lie detectors by private employers except
in narrowly prescribed circumstances. Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 199042
prohibits employment discrimination against qualified individuals with mental or physical
disabilities and obliges employers to provide accommodations for disabled persons if they can be
accomplished without undue hardship. The Civil Rights Act of 199143 legislatively overturned
several Supreme Court decisions that had narrowed the scope of Title VII and Section 1981
protection, and expanded the monetary remedies available to victims of discriminatory treatment.
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 199344 mandates unpaid leave for workers affected by
childbirth and family medical difficulties.
Judicial intervention has similarly restricted managerial freedom with respect to employee
terminations. As courts encountered shocking cases of wrongful discharge, judges began to create
exceptions to the common law employment-at-will doctrine.45 Almost all state courts have
recognized a public policy exception which precludes the termination of workers based upon
grounds that contravene important public policies.46 Courts have increasingly been willing to hold
employers liable for discharges that violate express or implied contractual limitations set forth in
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personnel policies or employee performance review procedures.47 A few state courts have even
found implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing in individual employment contracts.48 It is
likely that future judicial developments will further erode employer freedom in this critical area.
If employers continue to determine basic employment conditions unilaterally with no real
input from the affected employees, legislative and judicial intervention will probably increase. As
federal and state legislatures discover areas of significant abuse, usually by a few aberrant firms,
statutory provisions will further restrict the managerial discretion enjoyed by all business
enterprises. Where legislatures fail to act, dissatisfied workers will seek judicial redress. Judges
who are appalled by egregious employer behavior will look for ways to protect employee interests,
even though the resulting doctrines will constrain employers that do not treat their workers in an
unconscionable manner.

B. THE NEED FOR MORE INDIVIDUALIZED EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONS
Employer representatives regularly complain at employment law conferences about the
increasing legislative and judicial regulation of employment relationships.49 They assert that the
inappropriate behavior of a few aberrational companies have generated intrusive federal and state
rules that unreasonably restrict the managerial freedom of mainstream firms.50 They further
maintain that rational employers do not overtly discriminate or make personnel decisions based on
improper considerations.51 They note that such conduct would be economically inefficient. The
cost of replacing skilled employees who possess firm specific training is so high that corporate
leaders would not wish to place their firms at a competitive disadvantage by irrationally severing
beneficial employment relationships.52
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American business officials maintain that human capital is their most important resource.53
They claim to treat their workers fairly and generously, in recognition of the fact that satisfied
employees tend to be loyal and productive workers. To enhance employer-employee relations,
many United States companies have created shop level employee involvement programs.54 These
may be called “quality circles,” “production teams,” or “quality of work life programs.”55 These
arrangements are designed to facilitate communication between managers and employees, to
improve product or service quality, and to increase worker productivity.56
Employers are concerned that recent National Labor Relations Board decisions may have
jeopardized the legality of employee involvement programs.57 Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA58
prohibits employer domination of unions. Section 2(5)59 expansively defines “labor organization”
to include formal and informal employee committees that “deal with” employers with respect to
grievances, rates of pay, hours of work, or employment conditions. In Electromation, Inc.,60 the
Labor Board held invalid worker participation programs that are significantly controlled by
management officials.61 To counteract the impact of these Board determinations, corporate
leaders have sought the enactment of the Teamwork for Employers and Managers Act (TEAM
Act),62 which would provide companies with greater latitude in this area. Although the TEAM
Act passed the House and Senate in 1996, it was vetoed by President Clinton.63
Business leaders believe that worker participation programs are needed to increase workermanagement communication and to enhance employee quality and productivity.64 They recognize
that firms in countries like Germany and Japan have used employee involvement committees to
improve their competitive positions in global markets, and they would like to be able to achieve
similar benefits.65 President Clinton was not opposed to the worker participation concept, but
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feared that the TEAM Act passed by Congress did not adequately protect employee interests.66 It
seemed to focus too much on employer concerns, and failed to ensure that worker committees
would not be used to thwart union organizing efforts.67 The authorized committees also failed to
provide employees with the right to participate meaningfully in management decisions that would
directly affect their basic employment conditions.68
Corporate executives frequently complain about the lack of employee commitment to firm
objectives.69 They cannot understand why their workers do not share their own institutional zeal.
What they ignore is the way in which almost all American employment relationships begin -- with
letters affirming the right of employers to terminate the new arrangements at any time for any
reason.70 They also fail to consider the impact of continued employment insecurity generated by
both these at-will relationships and the absence of worker involvement in the managerial decisionmaking process.71 Employees reasonably fear that suggested productivity enhancements will not
be rewarded by greater firm appreciation, but by layoffs caused by the need for fewer workers.72
Employees also feel that quality improvements will only increase shareholder equity and
managerial bonuses, but not rank-and-file compensation.73
If corporate leaders wish to improve employee morale, avoid the further proliferation of
intrusive federal and state intervention, and retain greater localized control over their terms and
conditions of employment, they should recognize the benefits they could derive from truly
reciprocal worker participation programs. Employees would gain a greater appreciation for the
competitive pressures affecting their respective employers, and business firms would obtain
valuable input from their knowledgeable workers. Federal legislation could authorize
appropriately structured employee involvement committees to oversee the enforcement of safety
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and health regulations, wage and hour laws, and other similar employment legislation. Where
warranted, such committees could grant employers waivers from unnecessary federal and state
regulations, so long as these waivers did not compromise underlying worker interests.
Traditionally adversarial labor-management relationships could be replaced by more cooperative
employer-employee involvement programs.

C. THE LACK OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY FOR MOST AMERICAN WORKERS
The decline in union representation over the past three decades has had a profound impact
on American employees. Only ten percent of private sector workers are able to influence
management decisions affecting employment issues through the collective bargaining process.74
The other ninety percent must either accept the employment terms unilaterally determined by
corporate officials or resort to the “exit voice” and seek positions with other firms.75 For most
individuals who do not have an abundance of job opportunities and who have continuing financial
needs, the exit voice does not provide a realistic alternative.76 Furthermore, even when
individuals do have offers from several companies, they almost never have the option to select a
firm committed to true industrial democracy for non-management personnel. Moreover, when
there is a surplus of unemployed workers, employers are unlikely to feel the negative impact of
their prior actions.
The United States rightly prides itself on being one of the great democracies in the world.
People in other nations respect our voting tradition and the orderly transfer of power at the federal,
state, and local level from one individual and one party to another. We clearly believe that the
electorate has the right to information concerning governmental operations and the capacity to
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influence the actions of public officials through the electoral process. “Democracy is based on the
belief that social integration through citizenship is normatively and practically superior to
monolithic unity imposed from above [and] that an accepted plurality of interests is more
conducive to social cohesion and productive cooperation than an authoritatively enforced unity of
purpose . . . .”77 The private sector employment environment remains the most significant arena
in which democratic principles are denied to the overwhelming majority of regular employees.78
It is time for Congress to acknowledge two critical realities. First, the NLRA has become
an irrelevant statute for the vast majority of private sector employees. If unorganized workers are
to have the ability to affect their employment conditions, they must be provided with new
statutory rights guaranteeing them that privilege. Second, corporate success is dependent upon
three symbiotic groups: (1) the investors who provide the necessary capital; (2) the managers who
provide the requisite leadership; and (3) the employees who perform the basic job functions.
Corporate laws carefully protect the rights of business investors. Prospective shareholders
receive extensive firm information before they decide whether to purchase shares, and they
directly participate in the election of corporate directors.79 Firm managers owe shareholders a
fiduciary duty and are liable to stockholders who are injured by breaches of this duty.80 Since
capital is a highly mobile commodity, shareholders can protect their interests through
diversification and by transferring their financial support from poorly performing businesses to
other investments.
Corporate managers also possess the capacity to protect themselves against corporate
vicissitudes. They enjoy access to confidential information regarding firm performance, and they
exercise meaningful discretion with respect to decisions that affect their own futures. They can
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frequently avoid the insecurity associated with employment-at-will arrangements through
individual employment contracts that guarantee their continued employment for specified terms.81
They may also be able to obtain generous severance packages in case they lose their positions
through corporate reorganizations or buy-outs.82 They directly benefit from business success
through bonus payments and stock options that are unavailable to most subordinate personnel.
Rank-and-file employees are generally treated no better than the equipment they use or
operate.83 Even though they commit their working lives to the success of their respective
employers, their employment can normally be terminated at any time for any reason. They are not
privy to confidential firm information, nor are they consulted about business decisions that may
directly affect their employment destinies. Most lack the unique personal skills required to
provide them with significant inter-firm mobility. Furthermore, their continuing economic needs,
pension rights, and length of service frequently induce them to remain with their current
employers during periods of declining firm performance.
Americans in general, and employees in particular, feel increasingly alienated and
unappreciated.84 They also feel less trusting today than did their parents.85 Most employees
would like to experience the opportunity to be part of a larger employment community in which
they could openly share their ideas and concerns with their colleagues. They want to be respected
for their knowledge and be trusted to perform their job tasks even when they are not being closely
monitored by management officials.86
The time has come to acknowledge the significant contribution of employees to firm
success87 and to provide rank-and-file workers with fundamental employment dignity and
meaningful industrial democracy. They should be given a mechanism that will enable them to
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share in the economic benefits they help to generate,88 and provide them with some voice over
their employment destinies. We must recognize that “[t]he essence of industrial democracy is the
right of employees to influence decisions affecting their working lives.”89 Congress should enact
an employer-employee relations statute that will guarantee employees significant input with
respect to business decisions that affect their employment situations.90
This article will initially explore the worker participation programs already functioning in
other industrial countries, and the voluntary plans utilized by a number of U.S. corporations. I
will examine the different ways in which employees covered by these programs may influence
firm decisions at the shop level and at the corporate level. I will then propose a worker
participation model for American employees that would optimally protect the interests of
shareholders, managers, and employees.

II. WORKER PARTICIPATION MODELS
A. FOREIGN PRACTICES
A number of European countries have experimented with different forms of employee
involvement plans. Most include shop level groups that focus on diverse issues ranging from
narrow production topics to expansive employment considerations. A few worker participation
programs include employee representatives on corporate boards. These provide direct worker
input when fundamental corporate decisions affecting employment interests are being made. It
would be beneficial to briefly review some of the more salient forms of employee involvement.
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1. Germany
Germany has an established history of employee involvement programs. In 1891, it
enacted the Arbeiterschutzgesetz, which provided company owners with the right to establish
work rules unilaterally.91 If a workers committee existed, however, the owners had to initially
present proposed rules to that committee.92 In 1900, Article 91 of the Bayrisches Berggesetz
created statutorily mandated worker committees for mines with over twenty employees.93
The Betriebstategesetz, or Works Councils Act of 1920, directed the election of employee
representatives to supervisory boards, and provided for the use of worker committees throughout
German industry.94 In 1972, the Federal Republic of German enacted the
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz (Works Constitution Act), which directed the election of works
councils in firms with five or more employees.95 Corporations with 100 employees have five
council members, firms with 500 employees have nine council members, and firms with 1000
employees have fifteen council members.96 Council representatives are elected every four years by
the wage earners and non-executive salaried employees in proportion to their respective
numbers.97 Multi-plant corporations have central works councils composed of delegates from the
establishment-level councils.98 The vast majority of larger companies have works councils. In
firms that have not established councils, three or more employees may petition the labor court to
create one.99
Although German works councils do not determine basic compensation levels, which are
established separately through collective bargaining procedures, they do have codetermination
rights with respect to employee bonuses and performance-rated pay. 100 They also have
codetermination rights regarding overtime, leaves of absence, vacation plans, and the introduction

15
of work monitoring devices.101 Management officials must generally obtain council concurrence
with respect to changes pertaining to these areas, or face the possibility of external legal
challenges.102 Works councils possess limited veto rights concerning such critical issues as
employee transfers, downgrades, and dismissals.103 Impasses in these areas are resolved through
mediation or arbitration by a tripartite conciliation committee or the labor court.104 Works
councils do not possess the right to engage in work stoppages.105 Works councils have
consultation rights with respect to personnel planning, changes in work procedures, and the
introduction of new technology.106 They are entitled to information pertaining to financial matters
of interest to employees, and they directly participate in the enforcement of health and safety
standards.107
Works councils, which function primarily at the local level, are independent of
representative labor organizations that are active at the enterprise and even industry levels.108
Nonetheless, the majority of works councillors are union members, and unions frequently
nominate lists of individuals for council positions.109 Labor organizations provide works councils
with information and expertise, and council members work closely with labor officials.110
German business enterprises are governed by a management board (Vorstand) and a
supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat).111 Daily managerial functions are performed by the management
board.112 The supervisory board is responsible for overseeing the management board, and it
appoints and may remove members of that body. 113 Under the Mitbestimmung (Codetermination
Act) of 1976, one half of the supervisory board members in corporations with over 2,000 workers
must be elected by the employees.114 In smaller companies, employees elect one-third of board
members.115 Except in the coal and steel industries, in which employee elected board members
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possess power equal to that of shareholder elected members, management officials retain ultimate
authority in large corporations.116 This is due to the fact that some board members are elected by
lower level supervisory personnel, and the fact the chair of the supervisory board, who is
empowered to break tie votes, is elected by the stockholders.117

2. France
Unlike most Western European nations, which have relatively high union membership
rates, union density in France is similar to that of the United States.118 Despite this fact, however,
French workers have enjoyed a reasonable degree of industrial democracy since 1945. Firms with
more than ten employees are statutorily obliged to have employee elected personnel delegates.119
Entities with fifty or more employees must also have enterprise committees.120 Employees enjoy
dual representation in French companies through both personnel delegates/enterprise committees
and designated labor unions.121 Despite the low union density rate, union leaders enjoy expansive
power through their ability to nominate personnel delegates and enterprise committee members.122
Personnel delegates and enterprise committee members perform functions similar to those
performed by German works councillors. They are authorized to obtain relevant firm information
and to be consulted regarding various issue of interest to employees.123 Enterprise committees
focus principally on topics of corporate interest, while personnel delegates concentrate on local
issues pertaining to individual grievances and contract enforcement.124 Although labor
organizations may also represent workers with grievances, their primary function consists of the
negotiation of collective contracts.125
French collective bargaining was historically conducted on an industry-wide basis, which
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enabled unions to minimize inter-firm competition based on labor cost differentials.126 Individual
employers sought to minimize direct union involvement in local affairs through the use of
personnel delegates and enterprise committees.127 Prior to the early 1980s, the role of enterprise
committees was principally advisory. They were consulted regarding planned firm decisions, but
could only offer suggestions for management consideration.128 The 1982 Auroux reforms
restructured the collective rights of French workers.129 These changes were designed to
decentralize the bargaining process and to strengthen the function of enterprise committees. As a
result, more collective contracts are now negotiated at the firm, rather than the industry, level.130
The Auroux reforms have strengthened the grievance processing role performed by
personnel delegates, and enhanced the authority possessed by enterprise committees.131 Before
corporate managers make significant decisions pertaining to economic, technological,
organizational, or social matters, they must consult with enterprise committee members.132 These
consultation rights cover such topics as mergers, worker transfers, employee dismissals, economic
reductions, employee training, and the introduction of new technology.133 While corporate leaders
may not make final decisions regarding these subjects without first consulting enterprise
committee members and providing them with the information they require to evaluate proposed
changes, enterprise committees still cannot prevent the post-consultation effectuation of firm
plans.134 Nonetheless, enterprise committees frequently negotiate changes in company proposals
that help to protect worker interests.135 Enterprise committees also have the right to receive
information concerning the financial status of business entities.136
Worker participation at upper management levels is limited to the appointment by
enterprise committee members of two delegates to corporate boards.137 While these employee
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directors can express worker views during board of director deliberations, their function is entirely
advisory.138

3. The Netherlands
Dutch law began to require works councils in 1950.139 The initial employee committees
were intended to increase communication between workers and employers.140 At that time,
employers were still able to select the council chairs.141 Following statutory changes in 1979,
firms no longer possessed the power to designate council chairs, and works councils were
provided with expanded advisory and codetermination rights.142 Full works council participation
is mandated for firms with 100 or more employees, with more limited council participation being
provided with companies with 35 to 99 employees.143 Works councils are not authorized to
negotiate collective contracts, which are bargained by representative unions on an industry
basis.144
Section 25 of the Works Council Act of 1979 requires covered business entities to consult
with works councils regarding proposed decisions pertaining to such topics as enterprise control,
mergers, takeovers of other firms, significant reductions, plant closures, major organizational
changes, production relocations, major company investments, and the employment of outside
experts.145 When councils oppose employer changes in these areas, companies must postpone
final action for up to thirty days to give firm managers the time to reconsider their contemplated
changes.146 Council advice is also mandated with respect to the appointment or dismissal of
members of supervisory boards.147
Under Section 27, works councils have codetermination rights with regard to working
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hours, job evaluations, health and safety matters, staff training, grievance processing, and the rules
applicable to the hiring, firing, and promotion of employees.148 When council members fail to
approve proposals subject to codetermination, the firm may not implement the suggested actions
until it first obtains the consent of a cantonal court which must find that the council’s disapproval
was “unreasonable.”149
Section 28 provides works councils with the authority to monitor firm compliance with
statutory and contractual obligations.150 Council members are especially vigilant with respect to
questions involving possible employment discrimination.151
In highly centralized companies, there may be one works council at the enterprise level,
supplemented by employee committees at local facilities.152 In less centralized enterprises, each
establishment may have its own works council. Works council elections take place every three
years, and representative labor organizations usually nominate candidates for council positions.153
Smaller firms have seven council members, while firms with over 1000 employees have twentyfive councillors.154
Works councils have become established institutions in the Netherlands.155 Councilemployer relations are highly professional, with a minimal degree of adversarial polarization.
Employers who initially feared that works councils would hinder firm progress have found these
committees to be valuable consulting groups.156 Even though works councils do not conflict with
the bargaining functions performed by representative trade unions, other factors have caused
private sector union density to fall from 37 percent in 1979 to 18 percent today.157
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4. Sweden
Swedish workers are highly organized, with a union density of approximately 80
percent.158 Unlike other Western European countries that have established worker participation
programs that operate independently from representative trade unions, Swedish cooperative
groups are inextricably intertwined with labor organizations.159 Worker participation committees
were mandated by the Act on Codetermination at Work of 1976.160 This enactment provides local
union committees with the right to obtain relevant firm information and to be consulted on a wide
range of topics related to employment conditions.
Formal collective bargaining in Sweden is carried out on a centralized basis, with
codetermination councils being used at local facilities to monitor contractual compliance.161
When issues of local import arise, employers must meet with the appropriate codetermination
councils and seek mutual accommodations of their competing interests.162 In the early 1980s,
most codetermination procedures were formal and were conducted through conventional
negotiations.163 In recent years, codetermination discussions have been carried out on a more
informal basis, through regular exchanges between employer and worker representatives.
Swedish employers that initially opposed codetermination obligations now use those
procedures to enhance communication between labor and management.164 They regularly meet
and explore various issues of joint interest.165 The mutual trust and respect which have been
developed have enabled Swedish companies to reduce their workforces, improve employee
productivity, and reduce employee absenteeism and turnover.166 The success of the
codetermination councils has also led to a de facto decentralization of the collective bargaining
process, with many local agreements being established.167
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Under the Worker Directors Act, individuals who work for firms with more than twentyfive employees may select two or three members of corporate boards of directors.168 Most worker
directors are appointed by the representative unions involved.169 Employee directors are in the
minority and are thus unable to control board of director decisions.170 Nonetheless, they are able
to represent employee interests and keep union officials informed regarding board proposals of
interest to workers.

B. VOLUNTARY UNITED STATES PRACTICES
Despite the lack of codetermination legislation, a number of American business firms have
historically experimented with different worker participation programs. During World War I, the
Federal Government encouraged employers to adopt shop committees that would provide
employees with a greater sense of corporate involvement.171 Although most companies initially
opposed such worker participation schemes, some began to recognize that shop committees could
be used to increase productivity and employee satisfaction.172 Employees could always raise
issues of concern at shop committee meetings and seek an acceptable resolution. Labor leaders
quickly realized that such worker participation programs were being employed by many
companies -- not to provide rank-and-file workers with meaningful influence over their daily job
functions -- but as a means of manipulating worker feelings and discouraging unionization.173
These concerns ultimately induced Congress to include Section 8(a)(2) in the NLRA to prohibit
employer support for or domination of “labor organizations” which were broadly defined to
include employee committees that dealt with employers regarding grievances, rates of pay, and
working conditions.174
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During the 1960s and 1970s, a number of American corporations began to appreciate the
potential benefits that could be derived from cooperative employee participation programs.
Companies like General Foods, Harmon Industries, Rushton Mining, and AT & T endeavored to
“humanize” their production facilities by creating employment environments that provide workers
with a considerable degree to job autonomy. 175 The General Motors-U.A.W. Saturn Corporation
“experiment” and the General Motors-Toyota joint venture creating New United Motor and
Manufacturing, Inc. (“NUMMI”) provide more recent examples of successful cooperative
employer-employee participation programs.176
In more recent years, many other companies have decided to emulate their foreign
competitors and create shop level committees that are designed to minimize employee
dissatisfaction, enhance product or service quality, and improve productivity. A recent study
found that 64 percent of firms have established at lease minimal employee involvement
programs,177 while another survey found that 86 percent of the Fortune 1000 companies have
created involvement committees.178 Some of these programs have been carefully structured to
avoid problems under Section 8(a)(2). They try to facilitate employer-employee communication
and elicit worker input regarding relevant issues, but attempt to avoid discussions that would
bring their committees within the coverage of that NLRA provision.179
Other firms have not been so circumspect. They have established joint employeemanagement committees that actually resolve worker grievances and negotiate over existing
employment conditions.180 When such programs are created in nonunion environments and are
not used to thwart incipient union organizing efforts, they are unlikely to come to the attention of
the NLRB. I have heard a number of management lawyers discuss these committees at public
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forums and in private conversations. I would estimate that thousands of shop level committees
currently exist, many of which could technically be challenged under Section 8(a)(2).181
Fortunately for the employers involved, their employees are either sufficiently pleased with the
functioning of these worker participation programs or are afraid of company reprisals to question
the legal propriety of these plans. Other workers are simply unaware of the existence of the
Section 8(a)(2) prohibition.
The primary difficulty with employer-created participation programs concerns the onesided nature of these allegedly cooperative arrangements. Managers decide the structure of these
plans and the issues to be addressed, and they generally reserve to themselves the right to
determine which committee proposals to accept.182 This provides managers with the chance to
engage in opportunistic behavior at the expense of the employees. For example, when worker
participation committees improve productivity or quality, managers may decide to expropriate all
or most of the increased firm revenues. They have little incentive to share these gains equitably
with their collaborating workers. Rarely do the employees possess the power to require gainsharing as a prerequisite to the implementation of improved operational procedures. As a result,
employee members of such committees are often hesitant to recommend changes that may either
cause the layoff of redundant workers or result in increased firm profits that do not inure to the
benefit of the responsible employees.
Some might argue that reputational costs would deter opportunistic managerial behavior,
because companies with bad reputations would find it harder to attract and retain competent
employees.183 Others, however, have questioned the degree to which company reputational
concerns would preclude the excessive expropriation of jointly generated increased profit.184 Only
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firms with highly public reputations for egregious opportunistic behavior would be likely to suffer
any real negative consequences in this regard, with these negative effects being minimal in times
of high unemployment.185 It is thus doubtful corporate managers would be induced by this factor
to treat employees equitably when they are not required by other considerations to do so.
It is informative to note that a recent nation-wide survey of 2408 workers conducted by
Professors Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers found that 79 percent of individuals involved with
worker participation programs believe they have personally benefitted from those employeremployee arrangements.186 Over three-quarters of respondents thought that greater worker
empowerment improved firm competitiveness and enhanced the quality of the services or
products being provided.187 Furthermore, from 69 to 76 percent of surveyed persons without
involvement programs indicated that they would like to have such a collective voice.188 To the
extent these programs increase employee job satisfaction and firm loyalty, they and their
employers derive important benefits from their existence.

III. A PROPOSAL FOR MANDATORY WORKER PARTICIPATION
The time has come to provide rank-and-file employees and lower level managers with
fundamental employment dignity and true industrial democracy. This objective can only be
accomplished through federal legislation mandating appropriate employee involvement. No state
could accomplish this goal within its boundaries without risking the relocation of corporate
citizens to other less intrusive jurisdictions. A mere modification of the NLRA that would limit
or eliminate the impact of Section 8(a)(2) would not require firms to create employer-employee
committees. Furthermore, this narrow change would be used by many companies to create
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programs selfishly intended to improve quality and productivity with no corresponding benefit to
the affected production and service personnel.
What would ever induce American business leaders to accept a mandatory worker
participation enactment? First, effective employee involvement programs should enhance
productivity, quality, and employee satisfaction. Worker turnover should decline, making it
economically advantageous for corporations to accept the costs associated with greater firmspecific training. If worker participation plans were to function optimally, employees would be
less likely to unionize. Second, management officials should recognize that mandatory worker
participation systems should stem the proliferation of legislative and judicial intervention in
employment relationships. Through employee involvement committees, companies could decide
issues in a way that best satisfies local interests, instead of having to comply with national
standards governing all employment settings. In some instances, local committees could be
authorized to oversee compliance with federal and state employment standards, and even be
permitted to grant waivers from those obligations when warranted by appropriate local
circumstances.
Cooperative employee involvement programs would be beneficial for both workers and
employers, because they would open channels of communication between employees and
managers. These committees could insure that the “human aspects” of the work process would be
considered during managerial deliberations, and they would provide employees with the enhanced
sense of dignity and respect associated with industrial democracy and the satisfaction of being
able to influence decisions directly affecting their employment destinies.189 In addition, by
decreasing the current information imbalance which permits managers to act opportunistically at
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the expense of information-deprived workers, a greater employer-employee equilibrium could be
created.190
Corporate leaders must realize that their lower-level employees are not ignorant people.
They usually understand basic operations more thoroughly than upper managers. Workers are in
an advantageous position to enhance productivity and firm quality, but they are presently hesitant
to do so since such improvements may undermine their job security. If they were treated as
corporate partners in a cooperative venture and realized that new developments would not be
permitted to unduly affect their employment rights, they would be more inclined to propose and
support operational changes.
United States corporations that have instituted employee involvement programs have
generally experienced positive results.191 Job satisfaction has improved, and employee
absenteeism and turnover have been reduced.192 Cooperative systems also make it easier for
businesses to respond optimally to economic crises and international competition, because worker
input frequently provides managers with ideas they might not otherwise have considered. In
addition, employee participation in decision making increases worker support for the final
decisions.
Lower and middle-level managers might initially oppose employee involvement
committees. The reorganization of work environments through the establishment of joint
employer-employee committees might evoke substantial anxiety among supervisory personnel
who are accustomed to conventional superior-subordinate relationships between themselves and
rank-and-file workers.193 Managers would have to develop a new style that would motivate
employees to accept their leadership out of respect for their professional expertise rather than fear
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of their disciplinary authority.194 They would have to appreciate the fact that most individuals
work harder to obtain respect and praise than to avoid the negative consequences generated by
poor performance.195
Many labor leaders would undoubtedly oppose mandatory worker participation legislation,
because they fear that such employee involvement arrangements would become a substitute for
traditional union representation. They must recognize, however, that worker participation would
not render labor organizations irrelevant. Neither shop level committees nor board of director
representatives would be authorized to negotiate over basic wage rates or possess the right to
strike. In addition, if worker participation programs were to function well, employees might
develop a greater appreciation for the benefits to be derived from collective action. They might
decide to seek the more expansive involvement that could only be provided through conventional
union representation.
Successful worker participation programs should enhance employee job security and job
satisfaction, and should generate more hospitable work environments.196 In addition, with many
fundamental employment issues being subject to consultation with worker representatives,
historical employer opposition to union representation should decline. Even unorganized firms
would be obliged to consult with worker representatives regarding matters of mutual interest,
reducing the degree to which managerial freedom would be diminished through traditional union
representation. The cooperative nature of worker participation plans should also moderate the
adversarial nature of conventional collective bargaining, inuring to the benefit of both labor and
management. The fact that worker performance tends to increase more significantly with
employee involvement programs in union environments than in unorganized settings197 should
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further discourage employer opposition to unionization under a mandatory employee involvement
statute.
Union officials should support mandatory employee involvement programs, understanding
that labor organizations could continue to perform important functions for members who worked
in settings with such participative arrangements. Unions could provide workers with the
information and expertise they would need to participate meaningfully in cooperative workermanagement schemes. Furthermore, unions could continue to use collective bargaining to
enhance employee interests with respect to matters not subject to resolution through employeremployee committees.198 Labor leaders must realize that cooperative industrial relations plans
could beneficially supplant many of the inefficient practices associated with conventional
adversarial labor-management relationships.199

A. SHOP LEVEL EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT COMMITTEES
Congress should enact an employer-employee relations statute similar to the German and
Dutch works council systems.200 Every employer with at least 15 or 25 employees should be
required to create a minimum number of worker involvement committees. One committee would
be required for each separate facility. In locations with fewer than 100 workers, these committees
could consist of five persons, with establishments with 100 to 250 employees having ten worker
committees. Mid-sized facilities with over 250 employees could have committees comprised of
approximately fifteen people, with large installations with over 1000 employees having twenty or
twenty-five committee members. Where large facilities are involved, the law could require
employee subcommittees for each distinct department or for each group of inter-related
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departments containing employees who share a community of employment interest.201 These
subgroups could be comprised of five representatives. Multi-plant firms would be required to
establish enterprise-level employee involvement committees comprised of a specified number of
individuals elected by the members of plant level involvement committees.
Every three or four years, company employees would nominate and elect, in secret ballot
elections, the members of their respective worker involvement committees.202 Facility-wide
involvement committees would then appoint one or two committee members and have the
affected employees elect several additional individuals to staff each departmental subcommittee.
To ensure a meaningful dialogue between employees and management and to provide some
employment protections for managerial personnel whose employment interests are more aligned
with their subordinates than with their superiors, lower and middle managers would be allowed to
elect one-fifth or one-quarter of employee involvement committees. To satisfy worker desires for
truly joint employer-employee participation groups,203 Congress may wish to authorize upper firm
managers to appoint one or two involvement committee members who may or may not be
permitted to vote on committee issues. This would enable worker-elected committee members to
communicate directly with these managerial participants, and allow the managerial agents to
convey to workers the concerns of upper managers.
Even non-traditional workers should be permitted to participate in employee involvement
committee elections and functions. These would include part-time, temporary, and “independent
contractor” personnel who are increasingly being used by American corporations to avoid the
legal obligations owed to permanent employees.204 Contingent workers with more than short-term
connections to particular firms should enjoy the same employee involvement committee rights as
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regular employees.205
Business firms should be legally obliged to provide enterprise and plant level employee
involvement committees with information regarding basic operations and contemplated changes
that would meaningfully affect working conditions or employee job security to overcome the
information imbalance that has historically existed in most private sector employment settings.206
Proposed corporate changes with respect to basic operations, major new investment plans,
significant market strategies, the introduction of new technology, job restructuring, health and
safety concerns, significant job transfers to other facilities, group layoffs, and individual
terminations would have to be presented to the appropriate employee involvement committee or
subcommittee for consideration.207 Matters of general concern would be assigned to the full
committee, while issues affecting smaller groups of workers could be sent to the relevant
subcommittees. When fundamental issues would affect the personnel covered by several worker
committees or subcommittees, management should be required to consult jointly with the relevant
committees or subcommittees in an effort to achieve mutually acceptable accommodations of the
competing interests.
In most cases, it is likely that employee involvement committee members and firm
managers would agree upon the proper course to be taken. Rank-and-file employees understand
the need for corporate efficiency and increased productivity if employers are to remain
competitive in an increasingly global economy. They also recognize that superfluous or
incompetent personnel cannot be retained indefinitely without threatening the employment
security of all workers. Managers would obtain a better comprehension of worker concerns, and
would be forced to appreciate the need to formulate corporate decisions that would maximize
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worker morale and loyalty.
Congress should provide that when a majority -- or perhaps a weighted majority -- of
worker involvement committee members reject proposed managerial action, a mediator with
business experience previously selected jointly by managers and worker committee members
would endeavor to achieve a conciliated agreement. Specific time limits could be imposed to
require the expeditious consideration of controverted topics. On those occasions in which mutual
accords are not generated within the prescribed time limits, Congress would have to indicate how
the resulting impasses would be resolved.
For matters that directly go to the core of entrepreneurial control, such as those dealing
with basic operations or the direction of the company, an employee involvement committee
disagreement should not be permitted to preclude corporate action. After firm managers have
consulted with committee members and sincerely participated in the requisite mediation
proceedings, they would be empowered to unilaterally implement their actual proposals. This
practice would be similar to that currently operational under the NLRA with regard to issues that
constitute mandatory subjects for bargaining.208 Once good faith impasses are achieved,
employers are authorized to implement what they have already offered to representative unions at
the bargaining table.209 To prevent committee stalling tactics designed to undermine the need for
expedited company action, the passage of the prescribed time limit would ipso facto establish the
required “impasse” for the purpose of enabling the firm to make the desired modifications.
If Congress was concerned that disingenuous employers would use impasse-resolution
procedures to determine unilaterally most controversial policies, they could adopt an intermediate
approach. They could require disputes pertaining to fundamental company policies to be
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presented, on an expedited basis, before neutral individuals who would determine the relevant
factual circumstances and propose non-binding options. These suggestions could then be used by
the parties to regenerate previously unproductive negotiations. After the passage of several days,
firm managers would then be authorized to take the final action they deem appropriate.
Resort to mediation and fact-finding procedures should be mandated with respect to
proposed management changes that do not go to the core of entrepreneurial control but that would
be likely to significantly affect worker job security and/or basic employment conditions. The
minimal infringement of managerial authority in these areas of joint worker-management interest
is necessary to provide employees with reasonable participation in the firm decision-making
process. These steps would force corporate officials to at least consider worker interests and
employee, mediator, and fact-finder suggestions they may not have previously contemplated.
When firm officials fail to consult with employee involvement committees over proposed
decisions that would affect employee interests, Congress should authorize district courts to enjoin
corporate action with respect to those decisions until meaningful consultation has occurred.
When appropriate, courts should also be empowered to require sincere corporate participation in
mandated mediation and fact-finding proceedings before final company decisions are effectuated.
Congress might also contemplate the imposition of monetary sanctions on repeat offenders.
The relatively brief delays that would be associated with the need for employee
involvement committee consultation would be more than counterbalanced by the efficacy of better
informed managerial decision-making and a greater commitment to final determinations by the
affected employees. Studies have shown that works council consultation improves the quality of
the resulting decisions.210 Firm managers are able to obtain more complete information and are
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induced to analyze the relevant factors in an optimal manner.211 This redounds to the benefit of all
concerned parties.
Disagreements over employee dismissals would be subject to different impasse resolution
procedures. If management negotiations with employee involvement committee members do not
generate agreement and mediation efforts are unsuccessful, the dispute should be submitted to
arbitration for final resolution. The arbitrators would be jointly selected by managers and
committee members. To protect the right of firms to rid themselves of marginal or disruptive
personnel, Congress could reject the traditional labor-management practice of requiring employers
to demonstrate “just cause” for termination decisions.212 The burden of persuasion could instead
be placed upon the adversely affected employees to establish the absence of any reasonable basis
for their discharge. Since rational employers do not normally dismiss workers without any
justification, such a limited review procedure would not unduly restrict managerial freedom. It
would merely curtail terminations that were not based on just cause or were imposed for improper
reasons.
Congress could reduce federal and state regulatory costs by authorizing employee
involvement committees to supervise the enforcement of health and safety regulations, wage and
hour laws, family and medical leave provisions, and other similar employment legislation.
Regular committee monitoring would be far more effective than sporadic inspections conducted
on rare occasions by understaffed federal and state agencies. Furthermore, employee involvement
committees could be empowered to grant waivers from unnecessarily strict federal and state
employment regulations that would reflect on particular local firm circumstances and would not
dilute or undermine worker interests. Involvement committees could be allowed to grant safety
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and health rule variances and permit the substitution of compensatory time off for the monetary
overtime payments currently mandated by federal and state wage and hour laws. These practices
would be cost effective from a regulatory perspective, and would more thoroughly protect the
statutory rights of the affected employees.
Employee discrimination claims arising under state and federal civil rights enactments
could be subject to employee involvement committee review and resulting arbitral determination
before they could be considered by state or federal courts.213 Involvement committee participation
would enhance the likelihood of amicable resolutions, and many of the required arbitral
determinations would be accepted by losing parties without the need for further proceedings. In
those relatively few instances in which these procedures failed to generate final dispositions,
resulting judicial involvement could be minimized through the court acceptance of arbitral fact
determinations that are generated by appropriate proceedings and are supported by adequate
records.214 Legal conclusions should, however, be subject to de novo judicial determination.
Corporate officials who are required to share confidential firm information with employee
involvement committee or subcommittee members might reasonably fear the public disclosure of
that information. To minimize this risk, Congress should forbid the disclosure of confidential
information by committee or subcommittee members, and impose severe criminal and/or civil
penalties on violators. Such a restriction would merely acknowledge the injury that could be
caused to both the company and its workers by the thoughtless or malicious disclosure of trade
secrets or confidential proprietary information.
Employee involvement committee participants (and worker-elected board of director
members) would enjoy access to firm financial information that would be relevant to the
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determination of employee wage and benefit increases. While they would have the right to
express worker views regarding these important matters, they should not be authorized to engage
in conventional collective bargaining over general employee compensation levels or be permitted
to conduct work stoppages over any employment disputes.215 If they were given these expansive
rights, traditional labor organizations would be rendered superfluous. If employees desire these
expansive prerogatives, they should have to select a formal bargaining representative. Only if the
labor movement were to become a truly moribund institution should Congress contemplate a
formal degree of employee involvement committee participation with respect to the determination
of basic wages, hours, and working conditions.
Despite the lack of collective bargaining rights, involvement committees should have the
right to negotiate about incentive wage increases or gain-sharing that might be granted to
particular individuals or groups of workers as a result of their increased productivity or other costsaving innovations. If such performance-based remuneration issues could not be discussed,
involvement committee members would be reluctant to suggest operational improvements that
would only be of financial benefit to managers and shareholders at the expense of the responsible
workers. The availability of gain-sharing discussions would encourage the disclosure of
employee-developed cost saving measures, and prevent the opportunistic managerial
expropriation of worker-generated savings.

B. BOARD OF DIRECTOR PARTICIPATION
Shop level employee involvement committees could not provide workers with full
participation rights. While those committees would significantly increase employee input with
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respect to daily decisions affecting their employment destinies, they could not affect the
fundamental decisions made at the top of corporate hierarchies. If workers are to have the
capacity to influence upper management deliberations, they must be provided with board of
director representation.216
In a new employer-employee relations act, Congress should mandate the election of onequarter or one-third of corporate board members by non-executive personnel. Both rank-and-file
employees and lower level managers should be given the opportunity to nominate and vote for
worker representatives. This would guarantee board consideration of worker interests when
important firm policies are being debated. Where relevant, these board members might be able to
offer alternative proposals that would have a less devastating impact on employee interests.
Employee-elected board members should not merely serve the interests of workers. Both
these board members and those elected by shareholders should have a dual fiduciary duty. They
should be obliged to consider both shareholder and worker interests when they make business
decisions,217 and they should be subject to liability to either employees or shareholders when they
violate their fiduciary obligation to either group.218
Some people might suggest that employee-elected board members should only owe a
fiduciary duty to the workers who elected them, with shareholder-elected representatives having a
duty solely to the stockholders.219 This bifurcated approach would continue the outmoded
adversarial manager-worker relationships of the past and generate constant intraboard power
struggles that would undermine corporate viability. 220 Requiring all board members to be
responsible to both shareholders and workers would encourage all board members to work
together in a cooperative effort to optimize the long-term interests of both groups.
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This proposal would clearly expand the duties that have historically been imposed on
corporate leaders. In the early 1900s, the Michigan Supreme Court succinctly described the
monolithic duty owed by corporate board members to the shareholders.
A business corporation is organized and carried out
primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the
directors are to be employed for that end. . . [I]t is not within the
lawful powers of a board of directors to shape and conduct the
affairs of a corporation for the merely incidental benefit of
shareholders and for the primary purpose of benefiting others.221
This narrow view of board of director loyalty was reinforced by the influential scholarship of
Professors E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Adolf A. Berle, Jr., and Gardner C. Means.222 There was a
concern that if multiple and possibly conflicting loyalties were imposed on corporate directors,
they would be unable to maximize firm profits and stockholder returns.223 In more recent years,
however, courts, legislatures, and scholars have begun to question this single-minded fiduciary
duty model.
Some court decisions have acknowledged the right of board members to consider nonshareholder interests when they make managerial decisions. For example, in Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co.,224 the Delaware Supreme Court indicated that board members of a buy out
target could consider “the impact on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders (i.e., creditors,
customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally).”225 Such decisions provide
board members with the discretion to consider non-shareholder interests when they reasonably
conclude that those other concerns should be taken into account.
A number of state legislatures have adopted “constituency statutes” that permit -- but do
not require -- board members to weigh non-stockholder concerns when deciding the future
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direction of their firm. The Minnesota law is typical:
In discharging the duties of the position of director, a
director may, in considering the best interests of the
corporation, consider the interests of the corporation’s
employees, customers, suppliers and creditors, the
economy of the state and nation, community and societal
considerations, and the long-term as well as short-term
interests of the corporation and its shareholders including
the possibility that these interests may be best served by
the continued independence of the corporation.226
Over the past ten to fifteen years, downsizing has become an organizational mantra for
many corporate leaders, resulting in the layoff of millions of American workers.227 Some of these
firm reductions have been required by economic exigencies and/or changing consumer
demands.228 When true business factors dictate employer restructuring, it would be irresponsible
to argue in favor of the continued employment of superfluous workers. Such an approach would
jeopardize the continued viability of the company and the future positions of the other employees.
This reality does not mean, however, that worker interests should be ignored when these decisions
are being made. Board members and CEOs should be legally obligated to consider non-layoff
cost-reduction options before they decide to implement significant reductions. Even when layoffs
are necessary, firm officials should be required to soften the impact of these reductions on the
affected personnel. Retraining and relocation possibilities should be explored to determine
whether loyal employees might be transferred to other useful positions. Severance packages could
cushion the adverse consequences for individuals who must actually lose their jobs.
Many corporate reductions appear to be motivated more by a desire to temporarily -- and
often artificially -- boost stock prices than by long-term economic or operational considerations.229
As company officials announce expansive cost-cutting measures and the concomitant mass
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layoffs, share prices tend to rise. Stockholders are gratified by the increased paper value of their
holdings, and corporate executives are rewarded by bonus payments and/or the opportunity to
exercise generous stock options.230 When the announced employee reductions are excessive,
former personnel are often reemployed as outside contractors or consultants, thus reducing the
true economic benefit of the proclaimed cut-backs.231 It is unlikely that these former workers will
ever demonstrate the commitment to firm success that they would have shown had they been
continued in their previous positions. As a result, the long-term benefits of these pseudoreductions are highly speculative.
Other corporate machinations similarly threaten employee interests. Large business
enterprises regularly restructure their holdings through mergers, sales, or acquisitions which
ignore the negative impact of these changes on firm personnel.232 If board members and CEOs
were required to consider worker interests before they decided to implement such restructuring
programs, they might either forego those changes that are not motivated by rational business needs
or negotiate contractual terms with corporate partners that protect employee interests. For
example, selling firms could require purchasing companies to retain the employees of the acquired
entities for a minimal period of time, or one or both concerns might assume the obligation to
retrain and relocate the displaced personnel.233
The contemporary corporation is no longer a wholly private entity that primarily affects a
limited group of shareholders, customers, employees, and the contiguous community. Large
domestic and transnational enterprises have a “profound effect on the lives of a variety of groups
not traditionally within the corporate law structure.”234 By expanding the fiduciary duties of
corporate leaders to at least include those most directly affected by fundamental company
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changes, Congress or state legislatures could greatly enhance the public interest. When wholly
selfish decisions are made that ignore appropriate constituent interests, legal liability should be
imposed.
Even though statutory provisions should recognize the dual loyalties owed by all board
members to shareholders and to workers, board members must enjoy sufficient discretion to
enable them to make good faith managerial decisions when stockholder and employee interests
conflict without fear of personal liability. Statutory codification of the established “business
judgment” rule should provide board members with adequate freedom to act on controversial
proposals.235 Corporate officials who could demonstrate that challenged decisions were designed
to achieve legitimate business purposes and that the interests of adversely affected constituencies
were fairly considered would be immune from liability.236 On the other hand, when they wholly
fail to consider worker interests and/or act to serve selfish personal or shareholder interests, board
members should be subject to the same legal accountability that would result if they currently
failed to respect the interests of stockholders.237
Although Congress may wish to treat closely-held corporations differently, because of the
limited number of shareholders associated with such ventures,238 there is actually no reason not to
treat these business entities the same as publicly-held corporations. While the directors of closelyheld firms owe a heightened fiduciary duty to the narrow group of stockholders,239 they could
simultaneously be obliged to consider employee interests when they make managerial decisions
that affect employment conditions. When they fail to give adequate consideration to the interests
of employees, they should be subject to the same liability as would directors of publicly-held
corporations who ignore worker concerns.
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C. THE ROLE OF UNIONS IN A WORKER PARTICIPATION SYSTEM
Labor organizations would not be rendered obsolete through the adoption of a national
employer-employee relations act mandating the creation of worker participation programs. They
could continue to provide employees with the assistance and training they would need when
dealing with employee involvement committees or corporate boards. Unions should have the
right to nominate employee slates for employee involvement committee positions and board of
director membership. Employer agents should be prohibited from coercing or restraining
employees with respect to the nomination and election of involvement committee or corporate
board members. This would significantly diminish firm conduct designed to undermine free and
fair worker elections.
If a majority or super-majority (e.g., 60 percent) of employee-elected involvement
committee members were affiliated with a particular labor organization, that entity could be
granted exclusive bargaining rights similar to those currently enjoyed by majority bargaining
agents under the NLRA.240 If no labor organization enjoyed such support, each union with 20, 25,
or 30 percent employee-elected involvement committee member support could be entitled to
formal consultation rights.241 Since employees may vote for union-nominated involvement
committee members for reasons unrelated to any desire for formal collective bargaining rights, the
statute could alternatively provide a separate ballot choice to allow workers to express their
interest in bargaining representation.
When they vote to elect involvement committee members, this separate ballot option could
be used to determine whether a majority of employees wish to be represented by a particular labor
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organization, and, if not, whether any specified union had a sufficient percentage of support to be
entitled to consultation rights. To be included in such a representational vote, a labor organization
would have to obtain the traditional thirty percent “showing-of-interest”242 from a group of
employees sharing a sufficient community of interest to constitute an appropriate bargaining
unit,243 with these issues continuing to be determined by the National Labor Relations Board.
Firm managers would be required to consult with representatives from each organization
that had achieved consultation rights before they made final decisions with respect to matters
affecting employee interests. Even though formal bargaining would not be required, these
minority entities could provide managers with critical input. They could articulate employee
concerns and propose options that would be less injurious to worker interests. Labor
organizations with consultation rights that are not consulted with respect to matters of interest to
employees should be able to petition a district court for injunctive orders precluding the
implementation of contemplated firm action before corporate officials satisfy their obligation to
discuss these matters with appropriate union representatives.
Labor organizations with consultation rights would not be empowered to engage in
traditional collective bargaining nor be permitted to conduct work stoppages. Employees
violating this principle would be subject to summary discharge, and responsible labor
organizations would forfeit their existing consultative status. Since consultative labor
organizations would not possess the power to block proposed management action, union leaders
would have to recognize the need to establish sufficiently cooperative relationships with
magagement officials to guarantee meaningful consideration of union suggestions. Since
adversarial behavior would be antithetical to real employer-employee cooperation, I would expect
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labor officials to seek to generate mutually respectful relationships that would optimally further
worker and corporate interests. Union leaders who try to convert consultation into full collective
bargaining or to continue antiquated adversarial practices would find themselves unable to
meaningfully influence corporate actions.

IV. CONCLUSION
The NLRA was intended to provide American workers with a meaningful degree of
industrial democracy through the collective bargaining process. Following the enactment of that
statute, union membership expanded rapidly and bargaining agreements effectively advanced
employee interests. During the past several decades, however, union membership has declined to
10 percent of private sector personnel. The other 90 percent of workers have almost no ability to
influence corporate decisions that significantly affect their employment destinies.
In most European countries, legislative enactments have sought to promote industrial
democracy through both local level works councils and employee-elected members of corporate
boards. It is time to acknowledge that collective bargaining is unlikely to further the interests of
the vast majority of American employees. If they are to be provided with a modicum of industrial
democracy, Congress must look for alternative avenues of worker input. Most U.S. firms have
voluntarily established shop level participation committees that are primarily designed to enhance
productivity and quality. Even though these programs have been used narrowly, most have
generated beneficial results.
American companies have sought NLRA amendments that would expand their right to
create voluntary quality of work life committees. If these institutions are to fairly protect worker
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interests, they should be regulated by federal statute. Covered firms should be obliged to establish
local employee involvement committees that would have the right to see relevant company
financial information and to be consulted regarding proposed changes that would significantly
affect employee interests. Mediation and fact-finding procedures could be used to encourage the
mutual resolution of conflicts between involvement committee members and management
officials. Wrongful terminations should also be proscribed and subject to employee involvement
committee consideration and, when necessary, external arbitral review.
Rank-and-file employees and lower level managers should be given the right to elect onethird or one-quarter of corporate board members. Both worker-elected and shareholder-elected
board members should be obliged to consider fairly the rights of both employees and stockholders
when they determine basic firm policies. Directors who fail to satisfy this dual fiduciary duty
should be subject to civil liability. On the other hand, board members who exercise their
managerial judgment in a rational manner to achieve legitimate business objectives and who
carefully consider competing employee and shareholder interests before they act should be
immune from liability.
Labor organizations that are unable to achieve majority support but do generate 20, 25, or
30 percent employee support should be granted consultation rights. While consultative unions
would not have the right to strike or be empowered to demand conventional collective bargaining,
they would be granted access to relevant firm information and have the right to be consulted
before employers implement planned policies that would directly affect worker interests.
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